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Cultural evolution requires the social transmission of information. For this
reason, scholars have emphasized social learning when explaining how and
why culture evolves. Yet cultural evolution results from many mechanisms
operating in concert. Here, we argue that the emphasis on social learning has
distracted scholars from appreciating both the full range ofmechanisms contri-
buting to cultural evolution and how interactions among those mechanisms
and other factors affect the output of cultural evolution.We examine understu-
diedmechanisms and other factors and call for amore inclusive programme of
investigation that probes multiple levels of the organization, spanning the
neural, cognitive-behavioural andpopulational levels. Toguideourdiscussion,
we focus on factors involved in three core topics of cultural evolution: the emer-
genceof culture, the emergenceof cumulative cultural evolutionand thedesign
of cultural traits. Studying mechanisms across levels can add explanatory
power while revealing gaps and misconceptions in our knowledge.
This article is part of the theme issue ‘Foundations of cultural evolution’.1. Introduction
Scholars studying howandwhy culture evolves have long focused on social learn-
ing. Thismakes sense. Formany researchers, culture is socially learned information
[1–3],making social learning central in the emergence of culture and a natural start-
ingpointwhen studying cultural evolution. In linewith this focus, scientists aiming
to explain the uniqueness of human culture began by asking how social learning
differs between humans and our closest relatives [4], inspiring comparative
research directed at pinpointing the learning capacities that set humans apart
[5,6]. Similarly, researchers interested in the origins of cultural adaptations (e.g.
igloos, food processing) began by asking how social learning, when iterated,
gives rise toadaptive, cultural evolutionaryprocesses [7,8]. This focushasbeenpro-
ductive, yieldingvaluable insights about cultural transmission, cultural adaptation
and the capacities that distinguish humans from other primates [6,9,10].
Despite the value of studying social learning—defined here as learning that
occurs through the acquisition of information from a social source—the current
focus has two major limitations. First, it distracts from other important factors.
Growing evidence suggests that many mechanisms aside from social learning
Box 1. Three levels of organization
We structure our discussion of mechanisms and other factors into three levels of organization:
1. The neural level concerns neurons and their interaction. Neural factors include neurophysiology, the structure of neural
networks and the density of neurons.
2. The cognitive-behavioural level concerns both mental computations and their behavioural outputs. Mental computations
include algorithms involved in perception, kin detection and representations of possibility. Behavioural outputs consist of
actions resulting from the interaction between individuals’ internal processes and their environment. Although cognition
and behaviour are often regarded as distinct levels of organization, we treat them together here because of the difficulty
of sometimes isolating mental computations from their behavioural outputs.
3. The populational level concerns features of populations such as size, structure and density, as well as traits that only exist at
the group level, such as markers of group identity.
Readers should note three complexities. First, these levels are hierarchically structured. Cognition, for instance, consists of
mental computations that emerge from interactions among neurons. Second, there are other levels of organization buried
within these three levels. Interactions among neurons, for instance, may give rise to neural networks, whose interaction
might in turn manifest as cognition. Finally, a phenomenon at any level can be influenced by entities at both lower and
higher levels. Cognitive algorithms are patterned abstractions of neural activity, but they can take as inputs information




































1 contribute to cultural evolution. The emergence of culture
hinges not only on social transmission but on cognitive
capacities enabling innovation, too. Cumulative cultural evol-
ution depends on high-fidelity transmission, yes, but just as
critically on cognitive flexibility and the frequency of interaction
between cultural learners. And cultural traditions exhibit
features that are crucially shaped by factors such as status asym-
metries and cognitive biases involved in evaluating cultural
traits' efficacy. We do not deny that social learning is important,
nor dowe assert that scholars do not appreciate that othermech-
anisms contribute. Rather, we contend that the focus on social
learning may distract from complementary mechanisms that
help explain central research foci, such as why some species
have culture or how cumulative cultural evolution emerges.
A second limitation of the focus on social learning is
that researchers commonly treat it simply as an expressed
behaviour, blackboxing underlying mechanisms [9,11,12].
Blackboxing is, of course, a necessary first step when explain-
ing any behaviour. A researcher trying to explain the spread of
prosocial religion might point to its effects on cooperation,
abstracting the molecular interactions and neural processes
involved in cooperative decision-making. To do otherwise—
to consider each molecule or firing neuron—would be unma-
nageable. But blackboxing also carries risks. In the case of
social learning, one problematic consequence is the resulting
assumption that different behaviours, such as social and
non-social learning, have distinct neurocognitive foundations
and thus constitute independently evolving ‘traits’ [13].
A related risk is that ignoring the underpinnings of social
learning overlooks the possibility that many learning beha-
viours may be the products of less specialized cognitive
building blocks (see [14] for a similar argument as applied
to other apparently derived human abilities). A complete
understanding of cultural evolution requires considering
mechanisms and other factors (‘factors’ from here onwards)
across levels of the organization and appreciating how inter-
actions among factors affect the output of cultural evolution.
Here, we review promising and understudied factors con-
tributing to cultural evolution. We organize these into three
levels of organization: neural, cognitive-behavioural and
populational (box 1). Our goal is to identify factors that add
explanatory power while revealing erroneous assumptionsand gaps in our knowledge of how and why culture evolves.
We also review the mechanistic underpinnings of social
learning to demonstrate how peering into the black box can
transform our understanding of culture.
Our aim is not to comprehensively enumerate the factors
that affect cultural evolution. Instead, it is to point readers
towards overlooked factors while illustrating the value of a
multilevel approach. In that vein, we focus on three questions
that have arguably attracted the most attention in cultural
evolutionary research:
1. What explains the emergence of culture?
2. What explains cumulative cultural evolution?
3. What explains the design of cultural traits?
2. Factors contributing to the emergence of
culture
Why do some species have culture, while others do not? Given
that culture relies on the social transmission of behaviour,
attention has focused on social learning capacities, mostly in
vertebrates, but in insects aswell [6,15,16]. Yet although culture
necessitates social learning, social learning does not necessarily
result in culture. For a behaviour to qualify as a cultural tra-
dition, it must be shared by two or more individuals and
persist over time [17]. Recognizing this, we here examine
social learning at different levels of explanation and consider
other factors potentially involved in the emergence of culture.
We review evidence that species such as bumblebees engage in
cultural transmission using general-purpose learning mechan-
isms. Given that these general learningmechanisms are shared
widely among animals—and are likelymuchmorewidespread
than culture—we consider how factors aside from social learn-
ing, such as innovation and social interaction,may underlie the
emergence of culture.
(a) Neural
Research on neural mechanisms helps specify which faculties
are involvedwhen an individual learns from another, resolving
whether particular neural specializations are necessary for cul-




































1 learning among model species where genetic and molecular
tools are available show that the neural machinery for social
learning overlaps considerably with that of non-social learning
and that suchmachinery exhibits commonalities across taxa. In
primates and rodents, social information triggers activity in the
same reward pathways involved in non-social learning, such as
the ventral striatum andmedial prefrontal cortex [18–20].Work
on rodents and humans suggests that, at least when socially
learning about threats, both social and non-social information
are processed in a common value-representation circuit [21].
Similarly, in Drosophila, the neurotransmitters [22] and func-
tions of neural structures [23] involved in social learning
are the same as those involved in non-social learning. Research
indicates that these structures play a role in learning, memory
and reward in vertebrates, suggesting a phylogenetically
ancient origin [22,24]. Although social learning can incorporate
information that non-social learning does not [21,25], the
capacity to learn from others emerges from mechanisms
designed for learning more generally [21].
Among the neural mechanisms of learning, those under-
lying long-term memory are critical because they allow social
information to be stored in the brain over long time periods
[16]. Despite their importance, however, such mechanisms
remain largely overlooked in the study of cultural transmission.
As biologists recognize, long-term memory must involve the
fine-tuning of gene expression, which can in turn involve epige-
netic change, making it a promising direction of future study
[26,27]. Although the mechanistic understanding of memory
formation remains superficial, research has shown that blocking
major epigenetic routes interferes with memory formation.
In rats, for instance, the inhibition of the DNA methyltransfer-
ases fully blocks contextual fear conditioning, as well as
memory formation, following the rapid methylation of
memory suppressor genes and demethylation of memory pro-
moting genes in a highly dynamic way in the hippocampus
[28]. Studying the epigenetic basis of memory will help clarify
its mechanistic basis and provide insight into the foundations
of learning and culture more broadly.
In short, the striking similarities of mechanistic pathways
among vertebrates and invertebrates suggest that the basic
mechanisms of culture are ancestral, and that culture may
be far more common in animals than previously suspected.
Insofar as non-cultural species have general-purpose learning
mechanisms, and therefore some form of social learning,
explaining the emergence of culture will require examining
capacities aside from social learning.
(b) Cognitive-behavioural
Research on cognitive-behaviouralmechanisms further demon-
strates that social learning can emerge from general capacities
serving to acquire information, regardless ofwhether that infor-
mation comes from a social source [29]. Consider bumblebees,
which copy the foraging preferences of other hive members
[30]. Researchers studying these learning behaviours have
found evidence that bumblebees engage in second-order associ-
ative learning. In the same way that Pavlov’s dog associated a
metronome tick with food, bumblebees seem to learn to associ-
ate the presence of conspecifics with rewards. And just as
Pavlov’s dog could then learn secondary associations (e.g. sali-
vating at a black square associated with a metronome tick),
bumblebees may learn stimuli associated with conspecifics
because they are reliable indicators of rewards [31]. Researchers
have provided support for this explanation using a series ofingenious experiments. They have shown that naïve individuals
do not yet treat conspecifics as indications of rewards [32] and
that reducing the reliabilityof social information [33] and associ-
ating conspecificswith bitter substances [32] leadbumblebees to
no longer use social information and to avoid stimuli associated
with conspecifics, respectively. Moreover, there is no difference
between how trained bumblebees use information from hetero-
specifics and how they use information from conspecifics [34].
Bumblebees socially learn by using general learning
mechanisms that are likely widely shared among animals.
If social learning can occur with widespread, general learn-
ing mechanisms, then which additional capacities are needed
for culture? One potentially crucial enabler of culture is the
capacity to innovate, which generates cultural variation
[35,36,37]. Although scholars have considered innovation
when explaining cumulative cultural evolution [38,39], the
capacities underlying innovation have gone largely overlooked
in explaining why some species have cultural traditions. The
importance of innovation has been demonstrated again with
bumblebees. Alem et al. [40] found that a technique on a
string-pulling task could diffuse from a knowledgeable bum-
blebee to the majority of a colony’s foragers. Yet they also
found that virtually no individuals could innovate the tech-
nique on their own. Bumblebees, like Drosophila [16], have
the abilities necessary to maintain and transmit culture, but it
remains unclear whether bumblebees can generate the requi-
site cultural variation. An animal’s capacity to innovate
seems to hinge on factors such asmotor variability, persistence,
exploration, analogical reasoning, neophilia and learning
speed [41–44]. Given that species vary greatly in their tendency
to innovate [45,46], the underlying capacities for innovation
may be critical for determining whether a species has culture.
(c) Populational
Population-level variables are usually invoked to explain
cultural complexity and aspects of cultural form (see §§3 and
4). But they are also likely key for whether a species has culture
in the first place. The capacity to learn socially has been observed
in supposedly solitary species such as the common octopus [47]
and the red-footed tortoise [48]. If, as some researchers suspect
[12], conspecifics interact infrequently in these species, it is unli-
kely that they have culture, because the stability of cultural
traditions requires that individuals interact frequently. Individ-
uals should be tolerant and sufficiently gregarious, both
cognitive-behavioural tendencies that, in turn, have popu-
lation-level effects [49]. In many cases, interaction alone does
not appear sufficient. Experiments with humans suggest that
multiple exposures are necessary for a trait to remain stable
[50,51], while theoretical work suggests that, under many con-
ditions, uniparental transmission is not sufficient to maintain
culture [52]. Moreover, given that many, if not all, cultural traits
are only expressed in particular circumstances, such as foraging,
mate choice and food processing [53], the likelihood that a
species exhibits cultural traditions should vary with the
number of contexts in which conspecifics interact.3. Factors contributing to cumulative cultural
evolution
While the capacity for culture is present across a broad taxo-




































1 repeated modification and social learning of cultural traits
over successive generations [54]) seems to be absent, or at
least uncommon, in non-human species. Recent research
suggests that some non-human animals may exhibit simple
forms of cumulative cultural evolution (CCE) [55–57], but
the diversity and complexity of human cumulative culture
remain unparalleled [10].
Despite attempts to identify the mechanisms responsible
for cumulative culture (e.g. [58–60]), there is still no consensus
on what makes human culture so distinctive. Because CCE
only operates when information is passed socially, scholarly
attention has focused on capacities that promote informational
stability. At the individual level, these include social learning
abilities that support high-fidelity transmission, such as imita-
tion and teaching [61,62]. At the group level, scholars have
stressed the role of the size of the population that shares
social information in buffering the risk of losing cultural
traits [63]. Still, theoretical work suggests that factors that sup-
port the production of new traits are no less important in
explaining CCE than are factors that promote traits’ mainten-
ance [39]. Furthermore, mechanisms that support high-
fidelity transmission only become important when individuals
are willing to abandon previous behaviours. Explaining CCE
requires recognizing the explanatory role of factors that con-
tribute not only to the maintenance of cultural traits but to
their production and spread, as well.(a) Neural
Evolutionary neuroscience can help explain cumulative
cultural evolution by uncovering the human neural mechan-
isms that promote the production, spread and maintenance
of cumulative culture [64]. Davis et al. [65], for instance,
attributed the existence of CCE partly to humans’ unique
behavioural flexibility, which allows individuals to relinquish
existing behaviours to adopt more efficient ones. The neural
underpinnings of this flexibility are still unclear [14], but
recent research has identified one potential mechanism.
Cross-species investigations tracking the activity of single
neurons indicate that human brains trade-off robustness (in
terms of higher speed of response and increased reliability)
for greater efficiency in information processing. This lower
robustness promotes the flexible learning of new tasks and
adaptation to new conditions although at the cost of slower
and less reliable production of behavioural responses [66].
Cultural evolutionary researchers have also suggested that
creativity and innovation might enable cumulative cultural
evolution ([37,39]; see also [35]). Indeed, the modification of
cultural traits includes what researchers call ‘guided variation’,
wherein human intention and intelligence produce cultural
variants that are on average culturally more successful than
would be expected by chance [7]. Evolutionary neuroscience
research allows us to pinpoint the precise faculties that might
underpin the production of guided variation. For instance,
comparative studies indicate that humans possess unusually
large brains (both in terms of absolute and relative size) and
that absolute and relative brain sizes correlate with innovation
frequency in primates [46]. Furthermore, human brains contain
more cortical neurons than those of anyothermammals, which
allows more neuronal specialization and increases the number
of computational levels involved in information processing,
decision-making and information storage [67,68]. These
examples demonstrate how considering the neural basis ofhuman uniqueness might help explain our capacity for
elaborate cumulative cultural evolution.(b) Cognitive-behavioural
Humans exhibit several cognitive-behavioural capacities
aside from social learning that allow the propagation of com-
plex cultural traits. One example is the capacity for future
thinking and mental time travel [59], which may be limited
to humans [69]. Mental time travel is potentially important
because acquiring complex culture can be costly. Stout [70]
observed that an apprenticeship in adze-making in the New
Guinean village of Langda began at the age of 12–13 and
lasted for several years, although ‘it might take ten years or
more for the highest level of skill to be achieved’. Ache
hunter–gatherers do not peak in their marksmanship skills
until the age of 40 [71]. A sensitivity to short-term self-interest
might prevent individuals from investing in learning beha-
viours that confer benefits later in life. By making salient
the long-term benefits, mentally travelling forward in time
might make individuals more tolerant of learning costs and
more willing to adopt unfamiliar behaviours.
The propagation of cultural traits that are not immedi-
ately beneficial might be further supported by our
comparatively greater motivation to attend to sources of
social information (e.g. [72]). Indeed, social learning abilities
only become important when individuals are motivated to
pay attention to what others are doing. Evidence for the
role of this tendency in the propagation of cultural traits
comes from comparative experiments conducted with
humans and other apes. Compared to chimpanzees, for
instance, children are more likely to solve problems which
they have failed to solve for themselves upon exposure to
social information demonstrating the solution [73–75]. Thus,
human motivation towards social information may have the
effect of allowing rapid acquisition of effective techniques
that are difficult to innovate from scratch. Importantly, this
tendency might be connected to other well-developed
human capacities, such as the theory of mind and meta-
cognition, which allow humans to recognize the intention
behind another’s behaviour and infer utility from social
demonstration [76].
Finally, cumulative cultural evolution should be favoured
by humans’ communication, a capacity that remains under-
studied in the cultural evolutionary literature. Humans
communicate in a way that is, if not unique to our species,
certainly distinctive [77,78]: human communication is not
just intentional, it is overtly intentional. Through behaviours
such as eye contact, motherese, stylization and exaggeration,
communicators show audiences that an action is done for the
audience—and this ‘for-ness’ helps audiences interpret the
stimuli [79,80]. Human infants can differentiate among beha-
viours produced (i) accidentally, (ii) intentionally but not
communicatively (i.e. without overt intentionality) and
(iii) communicatively (i.e. in an overtly intentional way)
[81–86]. Overtly intentional communication (and particularly
language) allows potential learners to query what they do not
understand and allows experienced individuals to explain,
justify and instruct, as appropriate to the needs of the lear-
ner [87,88]. Communication, like attention towards social
stimuli, may enable cumulative cultural evolution by promot-






































The population-level variables most often invoked to explain
cumulative cultural evolution are population size and
structure. According to experimental and theoretical work,
population size is important because the risk of losing
cultural information varies with the number of social learners
[89]. As the number of learners declines, the risk of losing cul-
tural information increases. Meanwhile, population structure
is important because learners’ opportunity for innovation
varies with the cultural diversity they encounter [90–92]. In
studying factors such as population size and structure,
researchers typically assume that individuals have uncon-
strained access to the solutions of the individuals with
whom they are connected. Yet in more realistic situations,
skilled demonstrators might have no interest in providing
useful information to unrelated individuals [93]. This limit-
ation suggests that more attention should be paid to the
formation of social links that are conducive to cultural trans-
mission. A recent study in hunter–gatherer populations
revealed that individuals invest early in their childhood in
a few close friends and that friendship facilitates the sharing
of social information during adulthood [94]. Other studies
have reported that social links are more likely to form
between people who share similar traits [95,96]. Group-level
traits, such as stylistic markers of group identity, might thus
promote CCE by extending the size of the social network
through which cultural information can flow. Finally, the
intensity of group-level competition might influence individ-
uals’ propensity to share information. Indeed, experimental
work shows that demonstrators set lower informational
access costs (the costs that potential learners must pay in
order to access the demonstrators’ information) when their
groups engage in between-group competition [97]. In these
examples, population level factors modulate individuals' pro-
pensities to interact and share information, and ultimately
shape cumulative cultural evolution. A better understanding
of how individual-level interactions produce population-level
dynamics will help clarify our understanding of the
emergence of cumulative cultural evolution.4. Factors contributing to the design of cultural
traits
Why do cultural traits exhibit the features that they do? As
with research on culture and cumulative cultural evolution,
research on the factors responsible for the design of cultural
traits grew out of a focus on social learning. Researchers inter-
ested in explaining adaptive culture—variants that allow
individuals to better exploit their environments—began a
fruitful tradition of building theoretical models in which
iterated social learning gives rise to emergent cultural evol-
utionary processes [7,98]. These include models in which
success- and prestige-biased learning drives the selection of
variants that promote prestige, health and other indicators
of success, and in which conformity and other learning
biases create enduring group-level differences, allowing for
selection among equilibria (cultural group selection). Of
course, researchers appreciate that other forces shape cultural
form. Boyd and Richerson [7] acknowledged the role of con-
tent biases, while proponents of Cultural Attraction Theory
have long advocated that features of our cognitivearchitecture favour some variants over others [99,100]. Never-
theless, we here propose that research on the cultural form
will benefit from considering factors beyond the most com-
monly cited cultural evolutionary processes. We highlight
the value of a multilevel approach and the advantages of
incorporating insights from fields such as economics and pol-
itical science, which have long aimed to explain the form of
institutions specifically [101–103].
(a) Neural
Examining neural underpinnings can help explain why cul-
tural traits exhibit the features that they do in at least two
ways. First, basic neural mechanics constrain the design of cul-
tural traits. For instance, Nieder [104] argues that neuronal
mechanisms of estimating number, which are products of a
phylogenetic heritage, contribute to the relative ease of discri-
minating numbers of low values (e.g. 1 and 2) over
discriminating numbers of higher values (e.g. 783 and 784).
This, in turn, contributes to the design of numbering systems,
biasing them to discriminate among low numbers but not
high ones (e.g. low-limit number systems such as ‘one’, ‘two’
and ‘many’) [105].
Studying neural underpinnings can also illuminate the
structure of cognitive systems, helping explain how our
mental computational systems affect which representations
we adopt. An example is mind-body dualism. Researchers
hypothesize that mind-body dualism, manifesting as beliefs
in souls, ghosts, zombies and possession, results from a com-
putational division between processing mental information
and processing physical information [106]. Although psycho-
logical experiments can indirectly indicate whether
information of the two kinds is processed separately
[107,108], another test involves examining where this infor-
mation is represented in the brain. In that vein, research
now suggests a division between those brain areas or net-
works specialized for social cognition and those specialized
for physical cognition [109]. Notably, the value here of exam-
ining neural activity is that it sheds light on the functioning of
cognitive mechanisms. Studying a cognitive mechanism at
the neural level allows us to better characterize the mechan-
ism’s behaviour and its effects on cultural design (see a
similar approach in the field of neuroaesthetics [110]).
(b) Cognitive-behavioural
Researchers have made major progress applying cognitive
science to explain the design of cultural traits. Many cognitive
and social scientists, for instance, ask how reliably develop-
ing features of human psychology predispose people to
find certain variants more memorable, believable, entertain-
ing, attention-grabbing or apparently useful [99,100,111–
114]. Such researchers have used attentional biases to explain
portraits [115], epistemological mechanisms to explain divi-
nation [116], mechanisms for representing agents to explain
gods [117], suites of automatic inferential systems to explain
economic beliefs [118], the mechanics of emotion to explain
story [119–121], the psychology of outrage and paranoia to
explain witchcraft [122], and systems for identifying causality
and conceptualizing humanness to explain shamanism [123].
Researchers have also found that people preferentially
remember and transmit negative information [124], threat-
related information [125], elements eliciting disgust [126]




































1 [127,128], helping explain the form of news [129,130], fiction
[131,132] (although see [133]), urban legends [128] and online
misinformation [134].
As this diversity demonstrates, studying psychological sys-
tems is potent for understanding how features of human
cognition fashion culture. But scholars have overlooked at least
one additional set of capacities: the subjective psychological cri-
teria involved in evaluations [135,136]. Evaluation crucially
contributes to the development of much of culture. People
often selectively copyand retainvariants theyevaluate as serving
their goals, over time resulting in increasingly compelling cul-
tural traditions. Still, mechanisms for evaluating causal
relationships can be erroneous, resulting in ineffective practices.
In a well-known example, scouts and managers of baseball
teams evaluated players on the basis of easy-to-observe traits,
while undervaluing traits that seemed out of a player’s control
(e.g. whether a pitcher threw bad pitches at them) [137]. This,
in turn, led to systematic inefficiencies in the design of teams.
Similarly, humans are endowed with cognitive mechanisms for
evaluating whether some technology produces the desired end.
However, biases in thesemechanisms predispose us to note erro-
neous causal relationships, such that actingononeobject (suchas
a voodoo doll) is thought to affect the target it resembles (a rival)
[138]. Magical practices seem to evolve because they are subjec-
tively evaluated as producing the desired end, even though
they are ultimately ineffective [139]. Characterizing the psycho-
logical mechanisms involved in evaluating efficacy will help
explain the evolution of functional complexity, systematic
inefficiencies and elaborate but ineffective technologies.(c) Populational
There are many population-level properties aside from popu-
lation size or structure that shape culture yet remain
underexplored in the cultural evolution literature. Perhaps
the two most important are power and competition.
Power is the capacity of a party to change other parties’ be-
haviour [140]. There are many ways in which distributions of
powercanshapeculture, but themost important iswhen individ-
uals compete to institute and maintain self-serving rules
[141,142]. The form of these rules is frequently determined by
the parties’ relative abilities to enforce their preferences. Distri-
butions of power explain, among many other outcomes, food
taboos in small-scale societies, rules for how children should
treat fathers, institutions of redistribution throughout Polynesia,
and the political institutions of colonial powers and their local
inheritors around the world [141,143,144]. Of course, just as dis-
tributions of power shape institutions, institutions can shape
distributions of power [144]. Still, power leaves such defining
marks on institutions and practices that it has become the pri-
mary lens through which scholars in fields such as Marxist and
feminist anthropology analyse culture. Although cultural evol-
utionary scholars have begun to consider power when
explaining practices such as religion [145] and human sacrifice
[146], and although some have considered it as an outcome of
interest [147], it should be considered when explaining any tra-
dition that involves conflictsof interest amongcompetingparties.
Another population-level characteristic that partly deter-
mines cultural form is the intensity of competition, whether
between individuals or groups. Competition determines
how much competing parties invest in services or signals,
driving variation in the elaborateness of culture. In markets,
higher competition among service providers drives up thequality of services, transforming products including cars,
supermarkets and even the trance performances of shamans
[123,148,149]. Increased status competition, which may be
driven by rising inequality, is correlated with higher invest-
ments in signalling, presumably as individuals want to
discriminate themselves from competitors [150]. This mani-
fests in increasingly showy signs of wealth and status,
transforming practices ranging from potlatches [151] to
female adornment on social media [150].
Population-level mechanisms aside from power and
competition shape culture as well. One example is what
researchers call ‘common knowledge’—roughly, recursive,
shared beliefs that enable coordination [152]. Without chan-
nels facilitating widespread coordination, populations often
sustain suboptimal practices, even when the majority of indi-
viduals prefer to change them. Social scientists posit that such
‘pluralistic ignorance’ has maintained suboptimal norms and
institutions including drinking behaviour on US college cam-
puses [153] and restricted female labour force participation in
Saudi Arabia [154].5. Conclusion
Explanations for the existence, accumulation and design of
cultural traditions benefit from a perspective that is both
broad and deep, that both considers interactions among a
web of factors and clarifies their contributions by probing
their deeper workings. Not only does such a perspective
reveal that a more diverse set of factors shapes culture, but
it also suggests that explanations currently regarded as
alternatives are, in fact, complimentary.
We reviewed potential factors at the neural, cognitive-
behavioural and populational levels. But other levels are
relevant too, including the genetic, epigenetic and inter-popu-
lational levels. Moreover, cultural evolution can be influenced
and constrained by physiology and existing cultural traditions
[155], as well as the biotic and abiotic environment. For
instance, explaining cumulative culture may require not only
specifying behavioural differences but anatomical ones, as
well. Since Darwin, theorists have hypothesized that unique
features of human anatomy, especially bipedalism, were key
for setting the evolutionary stage for our greater reliance on
tools and cultural knowledge [156]; cultural evolutionists
may benefit from considering such anatomical pre-adap-
tations. Similarly, explaining a cultural artefact like a spear
demands considering not only the transmission processes
allowing manufacturing knowledge to evolve, but also the
anatomy of the primate hand, existing tools and techniques
for procuring spear-materials, and the animals spear-makers
intend to hunt.
We have proposed many directions of future research in
this paper: among the most important is the development
of studies on culture in non-human animals. The lack of
data on culture in animals likely stems from researchers
only recently expanding investigations beyond charismatic
and supposedly intelligent vertebrates. After all, we now
have surprising evidence that even insects may have culture
[26,40], suggesting that culture is phylogenetically ancient,
present among ancestors that lived hundreds of millions of
years ago. This constitutes a stimulating challenge for the
study of the foundations of cultural evolution.
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